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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
PAMELA DIANE BORUP, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
       Nos. 44205 & 44206 
 
       Ada County Case Nos.  
       CR-2014-7993 & CR-2016-1111 
 
           
       RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Borup failed to establish the district court abused its discretion, either by 
failing to further reduce her sentence upon revoking her probation in case number 
44205, or by imposing a unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed, upon her 
guilty plea to grand theft in case number 44206? 
 
 
Borup Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 In case number 44205, Borup was convicted of felony domestic violence and the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., p.11.)  On March 4, 2015, following the period of retained 
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jurisdiction, the district court suspended Borup’s sentence and placed her on supervised 
probation for five years.  (R., pp.11-17.)   
Approximately 10 months later, in January 2016, the state filed a motion for 
probation violation alleging Borup violated the conditions of her probation by committing 
the new crime of driver’s license or commercial driver’s license violation in July 2015; 
committing the new crimes of robbery, battery, and violation of a no contact order in 
December 2015 (resulting in the charges in case number 44206); “having a relationship” 
with the victim for the preceding five months in violation of the no contact order; being 
discharged from the Terry Reilly Health treatment program for “excessive absences”; 
lying to her probation officer with respect to attending domestic violence treatment; 
failing to participate in treatment at Good Relationships Counseling; failing to attend 
Rider Aftercare treatment as ordered; failing to report for supervision in December 2015 
and January 2016; changing residences without permission; testing positive for 
amphetamines; failing to make herself available for supervision and program 
participation as instructed; and absconding supervision.  (R., pp.18-21, 38, 105.)  Borup 
admitted she violated the conditions of her probation by committing the new crime of 
driver’s license or commercial driver’s license violation, being discharged from the Terry 
Reilly Health treatment program, failing to report for supervision in December 2015 and 
January 2016, changing residences without permission, failing to make herself available 
for supervision and program participation, and absconding supervision.  (R., p.55.)  The 
district court revoked Borup’s probation and ordered executed a reduced unified 
sentence of six years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.61-64.)  Borup filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the district court’s order revoking probation.  (R., pp.65-67.) 
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In case number 44206, the state charged Borup with grand theft (in violation of 
I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(4)), misdemeanor battery, misdemeanor violation of a no contact 
order, and unlawful entry.  (R., pp.104-05.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Borup pled 
guilty to grand theft and violation of a no contact order, and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with 
three years fixed, for the grand theft, to run concurrently with Borup’s sentence in case 
number 44205.  (R., p.110.)  The district court imposed a lesser unified sentence of six 
years, with three years fixed, for grand theft, and ordered the sentence run concurrently 
with Borup’s sentence in case number 44205.1  (R., pp.125-29.)  Borup filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.137-39.)   
Borup asserts the district court abused its discretion in case number 44205 by 
failing to further reduce her sentence upon revoking her probation because she 
completed the retained jurisdiction program, complied with the terms of her probation for 
a few months, and accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to the new crimes in case 
number 44206.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.)  Borup has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion.   
Upon revoking a defendant’s probation, a court may order the original sentence 
executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Beckett, 122 
Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)).  A court’s decision not to reduce a sentence is 
1 The district court imposed a 79-day jail sentence, with credit for 79 days served, for 
violation of a no contact order.  (R., pp.125-29.)  Borup does not appear to be 
challenging that sentence on appeal.   
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards governing 
whether a sentence is excessive.  Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7.  Those 
standards require an appellant to “establish that, under any reasonable view of the 
facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment.” 
 State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005).  Those objectives are: 
“(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing.”  State 
v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).  The reviewing court “will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment,” 
i.e., “facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.”  Hanington, 148 Idaho 
at 29, 218 P.3d at 8. 
Borup’s performance on probation did not merit a further reduction of her 
sentence.  Borup was placed on probation on March 4, 2015.  (R., p.11.)  Within four 
months, she committed a new crime.  (R., p.19.)  Shortly thereafter, she failed the rider 
aftercare program “because she stopped attending.”  (R., p.23.)  Around the same time, 
Borup resumed “having a relationship” with the victim of the instant domestic violence 
offense, in violation of the no contact order, which she admitted continued for five 
months.  (R., pp.25, 38, 105.)  In October 2015, Borup was terminated from treatment at 
Terry Reilly Health because she stopped attending programming without permission to 
do so.  (R., p.23.)  Thereafter, she lied to her probation officer by claiming she had 
enrolled in, and was attending, domestic violence treatment at A New Path, when in fact 
staff at A New Path reported they “had never heard of her.”  (R., p.23.)  Borup 
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subsequently told her probation officer she was attending domestic violence 
programming at Good Relationships Counseling; however, when contacted, staff at 
Good Relationships Counseling reported Borup had only attended one group, and 
thereafter, she was “a no call or no show.”  (R., p.23.)  On December 1, 2015, Borup 
tested positive for amphetamines.  (R., p.26.)   
On December 13, 2015, Borup went to the victim’s residence, entered the 
residence – unannounced and without permission – through “the side door,” and 
demanded the victim return the dog they co-owned when they were dating.  (R., p.38.)  
The victim “told Borup that she needed to leave his house several times however she 
refused until she had the dog.”  (R., p.38.)  Borup took the dog outside “near the front of 
the house,” at which time the victim’s current girlfriend, Suzanne, pulled up and parked 
in the driveway.  (R., p.38.)  As Suzanne was getting out of her car, Borup “attacked her 
and stole her purse,” then fled the area.  (R., p.38.)  Officers responded to the residence 
and observed damage to the front door that appeared to have been caused by an 
attempt to pry the door open with “some kind of tool.”  (R., p.39.)  Officers also noted 
Suzanne sustained injuries to her neck, arm, and fingernails.  (R., p.40.)  “Attempts 
were made to locate Borup”; however, Borup failed to return to her reported residence 
and officers contacted Probation and Parole for assistance in locating her.  (R., p.39.)   
The following day, Borup’s probation officer sent Borup a message instructing 
her to report to the probation office by 3:30 p.m.; however, Borup failed to appear and 
changed residences without permission and without notifying her probation officer.  (R., 
p.24.)  On January 4, 2016, Borup’s probation officer again sent Borup a message 
instructing her to report to the probation office; Borup “responded by saying that she 
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had an appointment at 3:30 and that she was trying to get things taken care of before 
she went back to jail.”  (R., p.25.)  Borup failed to appear at the probation office and 
absconded supervision.  (R., p.25.)  She was arrested on a bench warrant several 
weeks later.  (R., pp.44-45.)   
Borup’s overall abysmal performance on probation did not merit a reduction of 
her sentence.  That Borup had no documented violations of the conditions of her 
probation for the first few months pales in comparison to her conduct in the ensuing six 
months wherein she committed multiple new crimes, failed to attend treatment, had 
ongoing contact with the victim – with whom she had a no contact order – for a period of 
five months, and ultimately absconded supervision.  The district court showed leniency 
when it reduced Borup’s sentence by one year upon revoking her probation.  Borup has 
failed to establish she was entitled to a further reduction of sentence, particularly in light 
of her failure to attend treatment and/or demonstrate rehabilitative progress, ongoing 
criminal offending, complete disregard for court orders and the terms of probation, and 
the resulting risk she presents to the victim and the community.  Borup has failed to 
establish the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing her sentence 
upon revoking her probation.   
Borup next asserts her sentence in case number 44206 is excessive because 
she completed the retained jurisdiction program and complied with the terms of her 
probation for a few months in case number 44205, accepted responsibility by pleading 
guilty in case number 44206, and because, she claims, “the sentence imposed in the 
2016 case nullifies the practical effect of the reduction of the sentence in the 2014 
case.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  The record supports the sentence imposed.   
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The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for grand theft in violation of I.C. § 18-
2407(1)(b)(4) is 14 years.  I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a).  The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of only six years, with three years fixed, which falls well within the statutory 
guidelines.  (R., pp.125-29.)  The court ordered Borup’s sentence for grand theft to run 
concurrent with her sentence in the 2014 case (case number 44205), resulting in a 
sentence satisfaction date that is approximately nine months later than the sentence 
satisfaction date in the 2014 case.2  What is effectively a nine-month extension of 
Borup’s sentence in the 2014 case is a nominal consequence for committing the new 
crime of grand theft while on felony probation.  Although Borup claims “the sentence 
2 See https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detail/112447.   
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imposed in the 2016 case nullifies the practical effect of the reduction of the sentence in 
the 2014 case” (Appellant’s Brief, p.7), the district court did not, at any time, indicate its 
purpose in reducing the sentence in the 2014 case was to ensure Borup’s sentence 
satisfaction date in the 2016 case did not exceed that of the 2014 case.  Borup did, in 
fact, benefit from the one-year reduction of her sentence in the 2014 case, as her latest 
sentence satisfaction date is now three months sooner than it would otherwise have 
been.   
Furthermore, the sentence the district court imposed in the grand theft case is 
appropriate in light of Borup’s ongoing criminal offending, the fact that the grand theft 
case involved the same victim as in the 2014 case, and Borup’s history of complete 
disregard for no contact orders.  The charges in the 2016 case stem from the December 
13, 2016 incident detailed above, in which Borup violated her no contact order with the 
victim, entered his residence without permission, and then attacked the victim’s 
girlfriend, injuring her and stealing her purse.  (R., pp.38-40, 104-05.)   
At sentencing, the state argued: 
In summary, Your Honor, this defendant has a long history of a wide 
variety of criminal charges.  Perhaps the most concerning is the crimes of 
violence, the domestic battery from 2014, an aggravated assault that was 
reduced down to an assault in 2003, a battery in 2004, and a host of no-
contact order violations, which is ultimately what she did here.   
 
She has, by the state’s count, six prior violations of no-contact 
order [sic].  And in this case, as the court is well aware, she shows up at 
her ex-boyfriend’s house with whom she has a no-contact order, and 
waltz’s [sic] into his house and then ultimately steals property from his new 
girlfriend or new interest that he is dating at the time.   
  
And so the state is very concerned.  We simply believe that 
imposition is the only option left open.  She is a high risk to re-offend 
pursuant to her domestic violence evaluation from the 2014 case.  The 
state believes that protection of society is the foremost interest here.   
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(4/20/16 Tr., p.7, L.9 – p.8, L.5.)  The district court likewise commented on Borup’s long 
history of criminal offending, stating, “I’m not inclined in view of the entirety of record to 
think this is an appropriate case for a referral to mental health court, and I won’t do 
that.”  (4/20/16 Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.1.)   
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence in case number 44206.  Borup’s sentence is appropriate in light of 
her incessant criminal behavior, refusal to abide by court orders that were designed to 
protect victims, failure to rehabilitate and unwillingness to complete programming in the 
community, and the risk she poses to the victim and to society.  Given any reasonable 
view of the facts, Borup has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm both the district court’s order 
revoking probation in case number 44205 and Borup’s conviction and sentence in case 
number 44206. 
       
 DATED this 11th day of October, 2016. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_________________________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
9 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of October, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
BRIAN R. DICKSON  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_________________________ 
     JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General    
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